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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUS AND CUMULATIVE INNOVATION IN THE EU AND THE USPDF电子书下载

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• 作 者：THORSTEN KASEBERG
• 出 版 社：OREGON
• 出版年份：2012
• ISBN：1849463069
• 页数：301 页

图书介绍： 查看图书目录点击购买PDF全本电子书 上一篇：QUANTITATIVE GENETICS IN THE WILD下一篇：INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON BILINGUAL EDUCATION:POLICY 《INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUS AND CUMULATIVE INNOVATION IN THE EU AND THE US》目录 标签：

1.Introduction1

1.1.The Previous Focus On Initial Innovation1

1.2.The Need to Account for Follow-On Innovation4

1.3.The Regulatory Problem and the Policy Levers5

1.4.Methodology and Structure6

2.The Relationship between IP and Antitrust Laws8

2.1.A First Look: Two Types of IP9

2.1.1.A Common Dynamic Benefit: Incentives to Create Markets10

2.1.2.Similar Static Costs: Preventing Competition by Imitation12

2.1.3.A Different Dynamic Cost: Blocking Follow-On Innovation and Improvements13

2.2.A Closer Look: The Anti-Competitive Potential of IP Rights14

2.2.1.IP Laws and the Basic Rights of IP Holders14

2.2.2.The Anti-Competitive Potential of Conduct Involving IP19

2.3.Approaches to the Relationship between IP and Antitrust24

2.3.1.Approach Ⅰ: Absolute IP Domination25

2.3.2.Approach Ⅱ: Inherency and the Specific Subject Matter as Legal(istic) Filters26

2.3.3.Approach Ⅲ: Balancing Different Means to Enhance Consumer Welfare32

2.4.A Positive Economic Analysis of the IP/Antitrust Interface46

2.4.1.Preventing Competition by Imitation (Reward Mechanism)47

2.4.2.Other Functions of IP and their Relation to Antitrust58

2.5.IP or Antitrust? Some Meta Rules60

2.5.1.Approach Ⅰ: ‘Pure’ IP Solution60

2.5.2.Approach Ⅱ: Antitrust as a Discretionary ‘Fine-Tuning’ Device61

2.5.3.Approach Ⅲ: Comparative Cost-Benefit Analysis According to the Competition Problem63

2.6.Which Antitrust Rules? Some Principles65

2.7.Conclusion67

3.The Concepts of Monopolisation and Abuse: What is the Correct Test?68

3.1.The Tests Used under § 2 Sherman Act and Article 102 TFEU70

3.2.Obstacles to Cross-Fertilisation?72

3.2.1.Exploitative Abuses73

3.2.2.The Elements of § 2 Sherman Act and Article 102 TFEU74

3.2.3.Leveraging75

3.2.4.What is to be Protected? Market Structure vs Consumers76

3.2.5.Enforcement79

3.3.Analysis of Potential Standards79

3.3.1.The Relationship between the Standard and Conduct-Specific Rules80

3.3.2.The Cost-Error Approach as Heuristic81

3.3.3.The Conduct Element—Suggested Standards85

3.4.Conclusion95

4.Refusals to Deal which May Impede Follow-On Innovation96

4.1.The Traditional Typology of Refusals to Deal98

4.1.1.Vertical Complementary and Horizontal Refusals to Deal98

4.1.2.Concerted Refusals to Deal102

4.1.3.‘Naked’ vs ‘Constructive’ and Conditional vs Unconditional Refusals102

4.1.4.Discriminatory Conditions of Supply103

4.1.5.Termination of Supply105

4.1.6.Refusal to Deal as an Instrument or as a Corollary of Other Anti-Competitive Conduct106

4.2.Cumulative Innovation and Bargaining Rules109

4.2.1.Repercussions of Mandatory Rules on the Incentive to Innovate111

4.2.2.Cases for IP Reform: Patent Thickets, Holdup, and Royalty Stacking112

4.2.3.Self-Correction of Innovation Regimes?114

4.3.A Typology of Refusals to Deal involving IP115

4.4.Scenario 1: Impeding Research into Follow-On Innovation116

4.4.1.IP Solutions116

4.4.2.Antitrust in Innovation Markets?117

4.5.Scenario 2: Impeding the Marketing of Follow-On Innovation119

4.5.1.The Potential Case for Antitrust: Foreclosure of Competition by Improved Products120

4.5.2.Some Conditions of an Antitrust Rule121

4.5.3.Comparison to Alternative IP Solutions122

4.5.4.Which Antitrust Solution: Leveraging Test or Essential Facilities Rule?124

4.6.Scenario 3: Refusal to Give Interoperability Information125

4.6.1.Gatekeepers on Markets with Network Effects127

4.6.2.Protection through Trade Secrecy131

4.7.Scenario 4: Refusal to License IP which Protects a Standard132

4.8.Scenario 5: Refusal to Supply Products on the Basis of IP133

4.9.Conclusion135

5.The Licensing Fee: Determining Liability and the Remedy136

5.1.The Royalty138

5.1.1.No Royalty138

5.1.2.Cost-Based Pricing139

5.1.3.Same Firm Price Comparison, Market-Based Pricing, and Profit Comparison140

5.1.4.Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR)141

5.1.5.Hypothetical Bargaining and Maximum Willingness to Pay142

5.1.6.At-Least Reasonably Efficient Licensee’s Maximum Ability to Pay143

5.2.The Relationship between Liability and the Remedy Price145

5.3.Non-Discriminatory Pricing?146

5.4.The Procedure: Bargaining, Determining the Price, Monitoring, and Enforcement147

5.5.Conclusion147

6.An Essential Facilities Test149

6.1.Condition 1: Harm to Competition150

6.1.1.Dominant Position150

6.1.2.No Circumvention or Substitution within a Reasonable Period of Time157

6.1.3.Elimination or Prevention of Effective Competition on the Adjacent Market158

6.2.Condition 2: No Ex Ante Investment Defence160

6.2.1.The Difficulties of Balancing in Innovation Cases160

6.2.2.Ex Ante Investment162

6.3.Condition 3: No Ex Post Efficiency Defence163

6.4.Conclusion163

7.Cumulative Innovation under US IP and Antitrust Laws165

7.1.The Initial Innovator’s and the Improver’s Positions under US IP Laws165

7.1.1.US Patent Law166

7.1.2.US Copyright Law172

7.1.3.US Trade Secret Law175

7.2.The General ‘No Duty to Deal’ Rule under US Antitrust Law176

7.2.1.No General Duties to Use and License IP Even Pre- Trinko176

7.2.2.The Effects of Trinko180

7.3.Potential Exceptions to the No Duty to Deal Rule181

7.3.1.Essential Facilities Doctrine182

7.3.2.Unjustified Change in the Pattern of Dealing187

7.3.3.Monopoly Leveraging Doctrine189

7.3.4.Margin Squeeze193

7.3.5.Discriminatory Refusals to Deal194

7.3.6.Concerted Refusals to Deal195

7.4.The Remedy196

7.4.1.Example 1: Kodak Ⅱ196

7.4.2.Example 2: Microsoft197

7.4.3.Example 3: Rambus199

7.5.Future Tendencies201

7.6.Conclusion203

8.Cumulative Innovation under European IP Laws and EU Competition Law205

8.1.The Original Innovator’s and the Improver’s Positions under National IP Laws in the EU206

8.1.1.German Patent Law206

8.1.2.German Copyright and Unfair Competition Law212

8.1.3.German Trade Secret Protection and Conclusion217

8.2.Limits to Refusals to Supply Based on IP under Article 102 TFEU217

8.2.1.Essential Facilities Test219

8.2.2.Margin Squeeze235

8.2.3.Refusal to Deal as a Complementary Strategy238

8.2.4.Discriminatory Refusal to Deal Based on IP240

8.3.The Remedy242

8.3.1.Substantive Criteria244

8.3.2.Procedure247

8.4.Future Tendencies and Conclusion247

9.Comparison and International Dimension249

9.1.Differences between the US and EU Approaches249

9.2.Potential Explanations for the Differences251

9.2.1.Constitutional Frameworks251

9.2.2.Beliefs252

9.2.3.Interests253

9.3.The International Antitrust Law of IP254

9.3.1.The Current TRIPS Approach255

9.3.2.Is Stronger Harmonisation of the Antitrust Law of IP Needed?258

10.Summary260

10.1.IP and Antitrust as the Framework for Cumulative Innovation260

10.2.The Relationship between IP and Antitrust Laws260

10.3.Monopolisation and Abuse: What is the Correct Test?261

10.4.Refusals to Deal which May Impede Follow-On Innovation261

10.5.The Licensing Fee: Determining Liability and the Remedy261

10.6.An Essential Facilities Test262

10.7.Cumulative Innovation under US IP and Antitrust Laws262

10.8.Cumulative Innovation under European IP Laws and EU Competition Law262

10.9.Comparison and International Dimension263

Bibliography264

Index293

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摘要：本文以“INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUS AND CUMULATIVE INNOVATION IN THE EU AND THE US.pdf电子书版文档下载”为中心，详细分析了欧盟和美国在知识产权反垄断和累积创新方面的现状、挑战和对策。通过对该文档的深入研究，本文旨在为我国知识产权保护和创新提供有益的借鉴和启示。

1、知识产权反垄断

在知识产权反垄断方面，欧盟和美国都面临着诸多挑战。首先，知识产权滥用问题日益严重，如专利滥用、版权垄断等，对市场竞争和消费者权益造成严重影响。其次，知识产权保护与反垄断之间的平衡问题亟待解决。如何在保护知识产权的同时，防止垄断行为，成为各国政府和企业关注的焦点。

针对这些问题，欧盟和美国采取了一系列措施。例如，欧盟通过《欧盟竞争法》对知识产权滥用行为进行规制，美国则通过《反垄断法》对知识产权垄断行为进行打击。此外，两国还加强国际合作，共同应对知识产权反垄断挑战。

然而，知识产权反垄断仍存在一些难点。一方面，知识产权的法律界定和标准尚不明确，导致执法难度较大。另一方面，知识产权反垄断案件涉及复杂的技术和法律问题，对执法机构的专业能力提出了较高要求。

2、累积创新

累积创新是知识产权保护和反垄断政策的重要目标。在欧盟和美国，累积创新主要体现在以下几个方面：一是知识产权制度的完善，如专利、版权、商标等制度的建立和完善；二是创新政策的制定和实施，如研发投入、人才培养、知识产权保护等方面的政策支持；三是创新生态系统的构建，如创新平台、孵化器、风险投资等创新要素的集聚。

然而，累积创新也面临着一些挑战。首先，知识产权保护与创新激励之间的矛盾日益突出。过度的知识产权保护可能导致创新成本上升，抑制创新活力。其次，创新资源分配不均，导致创新成果难以惠及广大消费者。

为解决这些问题，欧盟和美国采取了一系列措施。例如，欧盟通过《欧盟创新战略》推动创新政策的制定和实施，美国则通过《美国创新法案》加大对创新的支持力度。此外，两国还加强国际合作，共同推动全球创新生态系统的构建。

3、政策挑战

在知识产权保护和反垄断政策方面，欧盟和美国面临着诸多挑战。首先，政策制定与执行之间存在脱节，导致政策效果不佳。其次，政策制定缺乏前瞻性，难以适应快速变化的市场和技术环境。最后，政策制定过程中存在利益冲突，导致政策偏颇。

针对这些问题，欧盟和美国采取了一系列措施。例如，欧盟通过《欧盟竞争法》加强对知识产权滥用行为的规制，美国则通过《反垄断法》对知识产权垄断行为进行打击。此外，两国还加强国际合作，共同应对知识产权保护和反垄断政策挑战。

然而，政策挑战仍存在。一方面，政策制定与市场需求的匹配度不高，导致政策效果不佳。另一方面，政策制定过程中存在利益集团的影响，导致政策偏颇。

4、国际合作

在国际合作方面，欧盟和美国在知识产权保护和反垄断领域取得了显著成果。例如，两国共同推动《世界知识产权组织条约》的制定，加强全球知识产权保护。此外，欧盟和美国还加强双边和多边合作，共同应对知识产权保护和反垄断挑战。

然而，国际合作仍存在一些问题。首先，国际合作机制尚不完善，导致合作效果有限。其次，国际合作过程中存在利益冲突，导致合作难以深入推进。

为解决这些问题，欧盟和美国应进一步加强国际合作。例如，建立更加完善的国际合作机制，加强信息共享和执法合作；推动全球知识产权保护体系的改革，提高国际合作效果。

总结：

本文通过对“INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUS AND CUMULATIVE INNOVATION IN THE EU AND THE US.pdf电子书版文档下载”的深入研究，分析了欧盟和美国在知识产权保护和反垄断、累积创新方面的现状、挑战和对策。本文认为，我国在知识产权保护和反垄断方面应借鉴欧盟和美国的经验，加强政策制定和执行，推动国际合作，以实现知识产权保护和创新发展的双赢。

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